Noise Based Approach for the Detection of Adversarial Examples by Kloster, Matias Alejandro et al.
AGRANDA, Simposio Argentino de Ciencia de Datos y Grandes Datos
Noise Based Approach for the Detection of 
Adversarial Examples
Matias Alejandro Kloster1,3, Ariel Hernan Cúñale1,2,3 and German Mato1,2,3,4
1 Instituto Balseiro, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina
2 Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Argentina.
3 Departamento de Física Médica, Centro Atómico Bariloche e Instituto Balseiro, 
Av. Bustillo 9500, R8402AGP S. C. de Bariloche, Río Negro, Argentina.
4 Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA), Argentina.
Abstract. We propose a new method for detecting adversarial examples 
based on a stochastic approach. An example is presented to the network 
several times and classified as adversarial if the fraction of times the 
output label is different from the label generated by the deterministic 
network is above some threshold value. We analyze the performance of 
the method for three attack methods (DeepFool, Fast Gradient Sign 
Method and norm 2 Carlini Wagner) and two datasets (MNIST and 
CIFAR-10). We find that our approach works best for stronger attacks 
such as DeepFool and CW2, and could be used as part of a scheme where 
several methods are applied simultaneously in order to estimate if a given 
input is adversarial or not.
1 Introduction
In recent years Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been successfully applied 
to a wide range of problems, such as image processing, speech recognition and 
genomics [10], Szegedy et al. [18] have made an intriguing discovery, in the 
particular case of image recognition, neural networks can misclassify an image 
that is slightly different from one extracted from the data distribution. In this 
sense, adversarial examples or adversarial images can be defined as those 
with this characteristic, and on the other hand, those extracted from the original 
dataset are called natural images. As it is mentioned in [6], a wide variety of 
networks with different architectures trained on different subsets of the training 
data misclassify the same adversarial example. This suggests that adversarial 
examples expose fundamental problems in the most used training algorithms.
Let us note that natural and adversarial images can be very similar and even 
almost indistinguishable to humans. As an example, in Fig. 1 we show the image 
of a dog, the perturbation found by a specific attack and finally the corresponding 
adversarial image which is categorized as a cat.
The analysis of this problem has been divided in several questions:
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Fig. 1: Example of an adversarial image. Left panel: natural image classified as a. 
dog. Central panel: perturbation found using the DeepFool attack (in absolute 
value and multiplied by a. factor 100). Right panel: adversarial image classified 
by the network as a. cat.
How to generate an adversarial example: The problem of finding an adversar­
ial example was previously treated as an optimization problem. For example, 
Szegedy et al. [18] solve the problem using a. box constrained L-BFGS algorithm. 
Another method that uses an optimization approach is Carlini-Wagner (CW) [2], 
Here several possible regularizes are introduced in order to find the minimal 
perturbation with respect to different metrics.
Other approaches are based on a. more geometrical interpretation. Neural 
networks for image categorization can be interpreted as a. very high dimensional 
function, where the input is a. vector representing the image and the output 
is a. set of n numbers, being n the amount of possible categories. Each one of 
these numbers represents the probability that the image belongs to that class. 
The most probable category is the one that obtains the highest number. With 
this interpretation it is easy to see that there is a. set of decision borders, that 
determine the points where two output units have the same value. Therefore, 
given a. natural image, one can try modify it to reach and cross some of the 
decision borders of the neural network. The direction of the modification can 
be approximated using the gradient of the loss function, giving rise to the Fast 
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] or iteratively evaluating the gradient of the 
outputs themselves as in the DeepFool method [15],
Another approach is based in locating the part of the image that should be 
perturbed in order to change the classification given by the network. This can 
be achieved by evaluating the saliency map [16], Given the saliency map, the 
method picks the most important pixel and modi lies it to increase the likelihood 
of a. given class . This is repeated until either more than a. set threshold of pixels 
are modified which makes the attack detectable, or it succeeds in changing the 
classification.
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How to defend against adversarial attacks: A defense is a process by which a neural 
network learns to correctly classify an example that was previously constructed 
to become an adversarial example. This topic has been extensively studied (see 
for instance [20]). Here we mention only a few of the several approaches that 
have been tried in this direction. For instance defensive distillation [17] is used to 
smooth the model learned by a DNN architecture during training by helping the 
model to generalize better to samples outside of its training dataset and making 
it more robust to adversarial examples. Similarly, in [4] stochastic pruning is 
proposed to improve robustness. Transformations in the input have been also 
proposed as a defense mechanism [8],
How to detect adversarial attacks: This problem is to detect whether a given 
input has been manipulated to generate a spurious output. Carlini and Wagner, 
show in [1] the difficulty of succeeding in this problem. In their paper, they 
analyze ten different strategies to identify which one obtains better results 
in terms of detection. The strategy that obtained the best results is Dropout 
randomization [5], in which Feinman et al. propose to measure the uncertainty of 
a network against a certain input. To do this, randomness is added to the network 
architecture, hoping that natural images will be categorized in the same way 
despite this random factor. On the other hand, it is expected that the prediction of 
adversarial images will not always be the same in all iterations. Other approaches 
are feature squeezing [19], where the search space available to an adversary is 
reduced by coalescing samples that correspond to many different feature vectors 
in the original space into a single sample. Comparing the prediction of the DNN 
model corresponding to the original input with the prediction of squeezed inputs, 
feature squeezing detects adversarial examples with good accuracy. Meng and 
Chen [13] independently proposed a similar adversary detection method as Xu 
et al. [19] that also uses the prediction vectors of the original and the filtered 
images. Metzen et al. [14] propose to attach a convolutional neural network-based 
detector as a branch off a middle layer of the original DNN model. Other authors 
base the detection on the study of the statistical properties of the inputs. For 
instance [7] adds a new adversarial class in the last layer of the DNN model . The 
revised model is trained with both legitimate and adversarial examples, in [12] the 
statistics is analyzed at the level of the convolutional filters. Dathathri et al. [3] 
propose a different approach called neural fingerprinting. It consists in detecting 
adversarial examples by verifying whether model behavior is consistent with a 
set of secret fingerprints, inspired by the use of biometric and cryptographic 
signatures.
Even when this problem has received a lot of attention it can be considered 
as unsolved. As it is mentioned in [1] these detection methods are not really 
robust meaning that the attacker can fool them by performing another attack 
on a modified network. This network has an additional output, that informs 
if the example is adversarial or not. Generating adversarial examples on this 
network will, with some probability, defeat the detection method. This approach 
is less efficient for systems that use random perturbations, as in the case of 
Dropout randomization [5], Inspired by this result we propose a new approach, 
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that consists in analyzing the output of the network when the activation functions 
of the neurons themselves have a random component. The structure of the paper 
is as follows: in the next section we present the network architectures, the datasets 
and the adversarial attacks we are using. In section 3 we introduce the proposed 
detection method and show the results. In the last section we discuss the results 
and possible implications.
2 Network Architectures and Adversarial Attacks
We follow the notation proposed in [1], A neural network is denoted by a function 
F(rc), where x E IR". For a network that performs classification, the output of 
F is a softmax function, so the results can be interpreted as probabilities. We 
consider only feed-forward networks, where the output of layer i can be evaluated 
in terms of the output of the previous layer according to:
= y (AiFi_1(x) + F) (1)
where A1 is a weight matrix and //' a bias vector. All the network parameters 
can be grouped in vector 6. The non-linear input-output transfer function is 
denoted by g. The output of the network before taking the softmax function 
is denoted by Z(x). The learning process involves the minimization of a cost 
function J(0, {.w, y/}) with respect to the different components of the vector 0, 
where y are the outputs associated with each input x. The prediction of the 
network for each input x is given by
C(x) = arg maxJ-(F(x)y). (2)
The datasets used for the training of the models, and later for the generation 
of adversarial images will be MNIST [11] and CIFAR-10 [9],
In Fig. 2 we show the architectures to learn the important characteristics of 
each of the datasets for their subsequent classification. In all of the cases the 
global architecture is the same: a set of 2D convolutional layers, followed by a 
set of dense layers. At the last dense layer a softmax operation is performed in 
order to interpret the outputs of the network as probabilities. The results for the 
training process are shown in Table 1. Let us note that the two problems involve 
different levels of complexity. The characteristics of MNIST dataset can be learnt 




Table 1: Validation accuracy for the two datasets with the networks of Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Network architectures used for the MNIST dataset (left) and CIFAR-10 
dataset (right). The indices represent the dimensions. For instance 32,32,2 means 
a structure with a spatial dimension of 32x32 and 3 channels.
The adversarial examples are then generated using three different techniques: 
DeepFool [15], FGSM [6] and CW2 (norm 2 Carlini-Wagner) [2], Let us observe
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that we are working in the situation most favorable to the attacker, given that 
it has perfect knowledge of the network and weights used, in other words they 
all are white box attacks. Moreover, in all of the cases we analyze the attack 
methods that generate by themselves the label of the adversarial example, instead 
of having to use a label provided by some external source. In other words we are 
using untargeted attacks.
Next, we briefly explain each one of the attack methods.
2.1 DeepFool Method
For an image x, whose correct classification is ko we first evaluate
Zko(x) - Zk(x)
ar8 mm^o||V4Zfco(a;)_Zfc(a;))||2 (3)
In this way, we identify the target index that will require the minimal perturbation 
to cross the decision boundary. Now the input image is modified according to 
the following rule:
x —> x — (1 + 7?)r, (4)
where
Zko(x) - Zk.(x) 
\\Vx(Zk0(x) - Zk.(x))\\2
Vx(Zko(x) - Zk.(x)), (5)r =
and ig is some small number included to make more likely to go beyond the 
decision boundary. If this is not achieved, eqs. 3 and 4 are applied iteratively 
until the output class has changed.
This attack intends to achieve the perturbation that minimizes the l2 — norm, 
but generalizations to another norms are also possible (see [15]).
2.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method
As it was proposed in [6] each input image is modified according to the following 
rule:
x —> x — e sign (Vx J(0, {$})) (6)
Parameter e can be tuned to have an acceptable success rate for the generation of 
adversarial examples with a small perturbation. Let us observe that this method 
affects all the pixels in the image with the same absolute value.
2.3 Carlini-Wagner Attack (I2— norm)
This attack uses an optimization approach. For a given image x with initial 
classification ko, we search the image x' that minimizes the following function
Hx'-xii2 +cL(x') (7)
where the loss function L is defined by
¿(a:') = max(max{Z(x/)j : i /?q} — Z(x')fc0, —k) (8)
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Parameter k controls the confidence of the adversarial examples and parameter c 
regulates the relative weight of the constraint on the norm. Larger values of c 
will generate adversarial examples at a higher success rate but the size of the 
perturbation will be larger.
2.4 Performance of the Attack Methods
The performance of the attack methods can be quantified by the success rate 
Pgen, which is the fraction of times that they successfully converge on a desired 
label and by the mean size of the adversarial perturbations, which can be defined 
by Pad-u or L-2. Due to the fact that by reading other papers one or the other 









where x are the images in the test set and the vector r($) represents the 
perturbation generated for each image.
In the Attack results section of Table 2 we show Pgen and for each dataset 
and attack. Note that the Table 2 also shows the parameters used to perform 
the attacks. These parameters were chosen in such a way that /<, is similar when 
using different attacks over the same dataset.
Table 2: Results obtained when performing attack and detection in the two 
datasets. The parameters of the attacks were chosen in such a way that the size 
of the adversarial perturbations are similar between attacks for the same dataset.
Dataset Attack Attack params
Attack results> Optimal detection results





DeepFool Tj =: 0.01 0.18 1.52 0.99 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
MNIST FGSM € = 0.062 0.19 1.65 0.08 1.00 3.00 0.80 0.86 0.73 0.80
CW2 cte == 0.011 0.18 1.47 0.73 1.00 1.80 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98
DeepFool Tj =: 0.45 0.01 0.26 0.99 0.06 0.02 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.89
TIFAR-10 FGSM € = 0.005 0.01 0.26 0.39 0.14 0.14 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.59
CW2 cte = 0.0032 0.01 0.29 0.83 0.08 0.04 0.91 0.93 0.86 0.87
We can see that the three methods generate different results. DeepFool has 
the highest probability of success when trying to generate an adversarial example, 
so it could be considered the most successful method. In the other extreme FGSM 
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has the lowest probability of success. This probability could be increased by 
taking a. larger value of parameter e, but that would lead to a. larger perturbation, 
that can be detected by visual inspection.
Pot the MNIST dataset, the adversarial image of a. FGSM attack can be easily 
detected in the background of the image. The C-W2 attack has an intermediate 
behavior between DeepFool and FGSM. On the other hand, for the CIFAR10 
dataset, the three adversarial images are indistinguishable from the natural one.





Fig. 3: Sample of results from the MNIST dataset in the top row and the CIFAR- 
10 in the bottom row. Left panel: natural images. Other panels, from left to right: 





3 Noise Based Detection Method
As mentioned before, the main goal of this work is to detect whether a. given 
image is natural or adversarial. In order to do this, stochastic neural activations 
are added to the model, which means adding Gaussian perturbations of mean 
zero and a. variance to be determined, in the argument of the activation functions 
of some set of neurons. In the deterministic case the activation of neuron i is
given by 
(11)
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where g is the activation function, Fj is the output of neuron j, Ay is the 
connection strength between neuron j and neuron i and bi is the bias. Note that 
in the case of convolutional networks, neurons only see a local surrounding, so 
matrix A would have non-zero values in local connections and zeros in the rest.
Our proposal is to replace Eq. 11 by 
(12)
where & are independent Gaussian random variables with 0 mean and standard 
deviation cq. If cq is not zero the output of the network will be stochastic. We 
can present the same input several times obtaining different results. Suppose 
we present a given input Nr times. Let us denote with /r the fraction of times 
the prediction of the network is the same as in the deterministic network. Our 
methods predicts that the input is an adversarial example if /r is lower than 
some threshold value /r- Otherwise it will be considered as a natural example. 
The quality for the prediction can be evaluated via the ROC-AUG, that gives the 
fraction of true positives as a function of the false positives for different values 
of the threshold. A value of ROG-AUG of 1 means that there is a threshold 
value that discriminates perfectly between natural and adversarial examples. If 
ROC-AUG is 0.5, the method gives a random answer.
The expected behavior of this detection method would be that when the 
size of the perturbation approaches 0, the ROC-AUC should tend to 0.5, where 
adversarial examples, by definition, fool the deterministic network. By contrast, 
with very large perturbations, natural and adversarial images are so disturbed 
that they become indistinguishable from each other and ROC-AUC is also 0.5. 
In between, there may be some perturbation size with a ROC-AUC greater than 
0.5 and in the best case close to 1.
This prescription defines in fact a family of detection methods, based on which 
of the neurons have a stochastic activation. In this study, we have decided to place 
this stochastic activation in the last convolutional layer and in the penultimate 
dense layer. In this way we can analyze whether it is more effective to perturb 
the network at the feature level or at the level where the final decision is taken. 
A detailed analysis of which layers should be perturbed in order to optimize 
detection performance will be done in a future work.
Note that for each dataset the architecture to be used and the position of the 
stochastic activation has already been defined. Therefore, the only free parameters 
are the variances of the added Gaussian perturbations, that we denote by crconl) 
and crdense. Fig. 4 shows the results for the three attacks and the two datasets. It 
is important to mention that to obtain all the graphs in Figure 4 the datasets were 
filtered so that the only images taken into account were the correctly classified 
by the neural network and with successful adversarial examples generated
From Fig. 4 we can conclude that the optimal values of the variances of 
the stochastic neurons depends on the problem. For CIFAR-10 the optimal 
configuration is achieved for smaller values of crconl) and <r,
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Fig. 4: Values of ROC-AUC for the different datasets and attack methods as a 
function of acom, and crdense- The optimal ROC-AUC value, i.e. the highest, is 












A?o- o- o- o- o- o- o- o- o- o-
°dense








From these results we can choose the combination of variances <7com, and (Tdense 
that maximizes the ROC-AUC indicator. Then, using these optimal variances 
values, the optimal threshold fy value is calculated. This is the value that 
minimizes the sum of false positives and false negatives. Or what is equivalent, it 
maximizes the probability of success in predicting the nature of an image (Pdet) 
using this detection technique. Remember that the ROC-AUC and Pdet obtained 
until now were determined in the process of setting fy, so in Table 2 these values 
are shown as ROC-AUC set and Pdet set.
To validate the results, we use a new collection of natural and adversarial 
images that were not used to set the optimal values of ROC-AUC and Pdet- 
Using fy and the optimal values variances aCOTVO and (Tdense already obtained, we
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calculate the validation values of ROC-AUC and Paet over the new set of images. 
These results are shown in the Table 2.
In order to emphasize the difference in behavior between the different cases 
we show in Fig. 5 the distribution of values of fT for the different cases for the 
optimal choice of <Tcont, and a dense- Remember that the /r shown in each of the 
histograms graphs was obtained with a certain group of images that is not shown. 
Then, with another group of validation images, the value previously obtained 
is put to the test. The histograms correspond to the validation images.
When performing the FCSM attack on the CIFAR-10 dataset, the lowest 
values of ROC-AUC and Pdet were obtained. These values are congruent with 
the histograms of the Figure 5d which are difficult to discriminate. In the rest 
of the cases, there is an /r with convincing results that vary from 80 to 99% in 
percentage of success in detecting the nature of the validation images.
In order to make a comparison with other papers, the results obtained from [5] 
and [19] are presented in the Table 3. The generation of the adversarial examples 
in this work was done with the smallest possible perturbations to keep the 
adversarial examples as similar as possible to the natural examples. As a result, 
in the Table 3 it can be seen that the magnitudes of the perturbations chosen 
in this work are smaller than the rest. If we compare two detection methods for 
a particular attack, it would be preferable if the size of the perturbations are 
similar.
Table 3: Comparison of results between this paper, [5] and [19]
Data extracted from Dataset Attack L-2, -Pdet (val) ROC-AUc(val)
DeepFool 1.52 0.99 1.00
MNIST FCSM 1.65 0.80 0.86
CW2 1.47 0.98 0.99Noise Based Approach
DeepFool 0.26 0.89 0.94
CIFAR-10 FCSM 0.26 0.59 0.63
CW2 1.29 0.87 0.93
DeepFool - - -
MNIST FCSM 5.91 1.00 -
Feature squeezing [19] CW2 2.87 1.00 -
DeepFool 0.23 0.77 -
CIFAR-10 FCSM 0.86 0.20 -
CW2 0.29 1.00 -
DeepFool - - -
MNIST FCSM 6.22 - 0.91
From artifacts [5] CW2 4.71 - 0.98
DeepFool — - -
CIFAR-10 FCSM 2.74 - 0.72
CW2 2.70 - 0.92
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(a) MNIST - DeepFool
ÍT'cont’ — 0.60 , 77 cíense — 1.00
(b) CIFAR-10 - DeepFool
77 comí — 0.06 , 77 cíense — 0.02
(7com' — 1.00 .77 cCnsc — 3.00 77 com' — 0.14 \77clense — 0.14
77 com' — 1.00 , 77¿lense — 1.80 77comí — 0.08 , 77clense — 0.04
Fig. 5: Fraction of images that have a. given value of /r. Violet: natural images. 
Yellow: adversarial images. Remember that the histograms used for setting the 
value of fT are not shown. Instead, the histograms that are shown are used to 
validate /r-
4 Conclusion
We introduced here a. new method for detecting adversarial examples. It is based 
on DNN’s where some neurons can incorporate stochastic activation functions. 
We analyzed three different attack methods (DeepFool, FGSM and CW2) applied 
to two datasets (MNIST and CIFAR-10). We analyzed two possibilities for the 
location of the stochastic activation: the last convolutional layer and the penulti­
mate dense layer. We found that depending on the characteristics of the problem, 
the optimal values of the variances of the stochastic variables are different. A more 
detailed optimization of the parameters of the stochastic activations (location 
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in the model, probability distribution, etc.) could be performed. This would not 
only improve detection performance, but would also give us an insight to develop 
better detections methods.
As it is suggested in [1] detection methods should be tested for several 
datasets and attack methods. Several defenses that are useful against attacks 
such as FGSM or JSMA [16] fail againts stronger attacks such as DeepFool or 
CW. Here we show a method that, in contrast, works best for these stronger 
attacks and could be used as part of a scheme where several methods are applied 
simultaneously in order to estimate if a given input is adversarial or not.
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